Claude Kabemba
Angolan President João Manuel Lourenço, who is also the chairperson of the African Union and a facilitator in the DRC conflict, made news this week when he announced, after meeting President Felix Tshisekedi in Luanda, the direct negotiations between the DRC and the rebel movement M23. The DRC government has confirmed receiving the invitation but has not confirmed its participation. The rebels have welcomed the announcement.
This announcement was followed by the SADC Extraordinary Summit of Heads of State and Government decision to terminate the mandate of SAMIRDC. The summit also requested the commencement of phased withdrawal of SAMIDRC troops from the DRC.
The SADC decision summarises the entire debacle of the SAMIRDC in the DRC. It is a recognition of the failure of the military solution adopted by SADC. However, this decision is not surprising, it is simply a bit late. SAMIRDC's usefulness ended when they lost Goma to M23.
Since then, SAMIRC soldiers have been confined at the Goma Airport under the control of M23 soldiers. This is why the withdrawal of SAMIRDC will not be a unilateral act; it will have to be negotiated with M23. Since Rwanda is behind M23, Rwanda could decide, even if not publicly, how the withdrawal should happen.
Maybe to further humiliate SAMIRDC, especially South Africa, M23, under Rwanda’s dictate, could force the withdrawal to be done through Rwanda’s territory as it happened with the white mercenaries and the evacuation of the fourteen bodies of the South African soldiers.
In the meantime, the M23 has continued to advance and take more territories without any serious resistance from the DRC armed forces. President Tshisekedi has no response to the M23 military might.
In recent times, he has focused on diplomacy. His diplomacy has been quite successful with the UN resolution 2773 of 21 February 2025 which obliges Rwanda to withdraw its troops from the DRC territory and the EU parliament vote in February 2035 to freeze budgetary support and military assistance to Rwanda. Certainly, these sanctions are not a deterrent to the M23 advance.
In an unprecedented and desperate move, Tshisekedi has approached the Trump administration to partner in the exploitation of the abundant DRC minerals, many of which are critical to the transition away from fossil fuels. China is the world’s leading producer and exporter of rare earth elements (REE).
The entire world, including the USA, depends on China for REE. Because of its dominance in critical minerals and REE, China dominates the production and export of green technologies and semiconductors. China is using this dominance to restrict US access to REE.
Recently, China stopped the export of germanium and antimony to the USA. President Tshisekedi is offering the Trump administration access to critical minerals in exchange for protection against the M23 rebel movement.
The Trump administration has shown interest. The US wants to cut its dependency on China’s REE and is prepared to annex countries (e.g., Canada and Greenland) or force countries into resource deals (e.g., Ukraine) to secure its sources of critical minerals and REE. President Tshisekedi understands the USA's predicament and wants to use it to his advantage—to secure US protection against the M23 rebels in exchange for minerals.
However, three key factors might prevent the US from accepting this deal. First, President Tshisekedi does not have readily available reserves of cobalt, copper, lithium, or coltan to offer to Trump. Chinese companies own 90 per cent of the DRC’s known reserves of cobalt, copper and lithium.
The DRC cannot take them away from China overnight and give them to the USA. If this were to happen, China would drag the DRC government to court for a long time and this could render the DRC’s cobalt a stranded asset.
Regarding coltan, Tshisekedi has already lost control of production to the rebel M23 supported by Rwanda. The biggest coltan mine in the world, Rubaya, in the East of the DRC, which produces 120 tonnes of coltan a month, has been in M23-controlled territory since April 2024. The M23 is now at the door of Walikale where Alphamin Mine (an American company) is situated.
Alphamin is the only industrial mine in the DRC that produces tantalum. If M23 controls Walikale, Tshisekedi will have nothing to offer the USA. The Trump administration will have to consider the sustainability of a deal with Tshisekedi. The leaders of the rebellion could offer the same deal to the USA, and a deal with the rebels might be more appealing to Trump in the current situation.
It would give the US immediate access to coltan in the eastern DRC and could provide sufficient time and space to slowly engage in resource diplomacy to get around China’s dominance in the cobalt, copper and lithium sectors.
Second, the lack of transparency and accountability in the DRC mining sector could be a big hurdle. The US has always publicly maintained that it will only invest in the DRC mining sector under a transparent and accountable system. Currently, despite the DRC being a member of the Extractive Industry Transparency Initiative (EITI), the management of DRC’s mineral sector is far from transparent.
It would be difficult for the US private sector to openly operate in the prevailing conditions of corruption and mismanagement. Before any deal could be struck, a complete overhaul of the governance system would need to be engineered. This is not a small task. Considering how entrenched corruption is in the sector, it could take years for this to happen.
Third, President Tshisekedi has agreed to negotiate directly with the M23 rebels. This week, President Tshisekedi travelled to Luanda to meet with President Laurenzo. Lorenzo has since announced that direct negotiation will commence on March 18, 2025, in Luanda. Since 2022, when the M23 resurfaced, President Tshisekedi has refused to talk to them, preferring to engage Rwanda.
President Tshisekedi was determined to destroy the M23 militarily and avoid any negotiations that might weaken his hold on power. However, President Tshisekedi has never seriously prepared his army for this war. The DRC armed forces are disorganised, and demoralised (soldiers are not paid for months and sometimes do not have sufficient food) with corrupt generals.
Even with the willingness of SAMIRDC, in the presence of a weak DRC army, stopping the advance of well-organised and disciplined M23 troops was impossible. SAMIRDC did not fail; the DRC army failed. The proposed negotiations, if they happen, will reduce Tshisekedi's ability to engage the DRC in partnership with the USA.
History will repeat itself. In 1996, when the war started, President Mobutu Sese Seko also refused to negotiate with the rebel group of AFDL supported by Rwanda and Uganda. When President Mandela brought both Desire Laurent Kabila, the leader of the rebel group and President Mobutu aboard the South African naval vessel Outeniqua to negotiate, it was too late for President Mobutu.
ADFL troops were at the doorstep of Kinshasa. Today, M23 rebels have advanced deep inside the DRC and are preparing to take over Kisanga and the rich mineral province of Katanga. The M23 will go to the negotiation table with only one demand that President Tshisekedi step down. They will insist that the only way to end the war is for Tshisekedi to step down.
Despite the US government’s readiness to agree to any deal that gives its private sector access to critical minerals, time could be Tshisekedi’s biggest enemy.
President Trump is in business. He will choose the side that offers the best options for sustainable and long-term access to critical minerals and rare earth elements.
* Claude Kabemba is the Executive Director of Southern Africa Resource Watch.
** The views expressed do not necessarily reflect the views of IOL or Independent Media.